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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH

ALVEY DEVELOPMENT CORP.,
Plaintiff and Appellee,

]
]
]i Appellate Court No: 20000946-CA

vs.
VAN MACKELPRANG, et. al.,

1
Defendants and Appellants.

Category No. 15

]

REPLY BRIEF OF DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS

I. ISSUES PRESENTED
(A)

Did Plaintiff fail to perfect an appeal from the final, appealable

Judgment of the trial court; and therefore, does this Court lack jurisdiction to
consider the merits of Plaintiffs Cross-appeal? Should the Cross-appeal of
Plaintiff be dismissed?
(B)

Did the district court err in concluding that Plaintiffs are abutting

landowners when there is a strip of land between their property and the roadway
to which they claim right of access by prescriptive easement?
Did the district court err in concluding that a prescriptive easement
was created providing access to Plaintiffs property, when after the division of the
dominant tenement, Plaintiffs property does not abut on the claimed roadway
easement?

Did the district court err in concluding that when the dominant tenement is
partitioned into three parcels, that Plaintiffs acquire a prescriptive easement for
ingress to and egress from such parcels, which the road easement in no way is
appurtenant?
Did the district court err in concluding that when Plaintiff acquires a 50 by
60-foot strip of land as an undivided one-half interest with another party, which
abuts the claimed prescriptive easement; that the prescriptive easement will
benefit this 50 by 60 foot strip of land?
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Review the trial court's legal determinations for correctness, granting them
no deference. Standard Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Kirkbridge, 821 P.2d 1136,
1137 (Utah 1991). Questions of law are reviewed under the correctness
standard.
HI. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
It is undisputed that on July 10, 1998, pursuant to the parties respective
motion's for Partial Summary Judgments, the Honorable K. L. Mclff, in the Sixth
Judicial District Court, granted Partial Summary Judgment in favor of the
defendants, in which the court found that the claimed 60-foot deeded roadway
easement on the westerly 60 feet of defendants' residential property was a legal
nullity, this judgment which is now final, was filed December 23, 1998, (See
Exhibit "A" attached) and has not been appealed by any of the parties.
It is undisputed that on November 7, 2000, when Plaintiff filed there Notice

of Cross-Appeal they appealed only "the Judgment entered on November 1,
1999, and the Order Denying New Trial entered October 2, 2000." (See Exhibit
"B" attached).
It is undisputed that in Plaintiffs "DOCKETING STATEMENT" filed with the
Court the only issues presented on cross-appeal are: "The issues presented by
the cross-appeal are whether the 60 foot easement was valid, and whether is was
transferable to the Plaintiff." (See Exhibit "C" attached, page 2, paragraph 5.)
It is undisputed that the trial court ruled on the pre-trial issues of the 60-foot
easement on July 10, 1998, in the judgment filed December 23, 1998. (See
Exhibit "A" attached).
In fact in Plaintiffs Initial Brief filed with the Court on March 26, 2001, on
page 3 the second paragraph under "STATEMENT OF THE CASE" the Plaintiff
states: "The trial court ruled, via pre-trial partial summary judgment, that the
reservation of the 60-foot easement by Plaintiff's predecessor did not create a
valid easement, and that the transfer of the 60-foot easement to Plaintiff was
therefore ineffectual."
It is undisputed that neither of the parties to this action has appealed the
summary judgment filed on December 23, 1998, which are the issues that
Plaintiff now wants the court to review.
On July 17, 1998, Garkane Power Association, Inc., which owns the real
property, which abuts the defendants' residential lot, disclaims any interest in the
defendants' property. (See Exhibit "B" attached to Defendants Initial Brief)

On July 20, 1998, a bench trial was held, the Honorable K. L. Mclff, the
Sixth Judicial District Court Judge presiding. A Judgment was entered in the
above-entitled matter on November 1,1999. (See Exhibit "C" attached to
Defendants Initial Brief)
Both parties filed Motions for New Trials, which were denied on December
20, 1999, and the Order was filed on October 2, 2000. (See Exhibit "D" attached
to Defendants Initial Brief)
Defendants appeal is from the Judgment of the Honorable K. L. Mclff, Sixth
Judicial District Court, Kane County, Kanab Department, State of Utah, rendered
on November 1, 1999. (See Exhibit "B" attached)
IV. STATEMENT OF FACTS
On November 3, 1987, ALVEY DEVELOPMENT CORP., (Appellee),
acquired real property, which is approximately 30 acres (Alvey property is
identified as K-19-8 ANNEX on Exhibit "F" attached to Defendants Initial Brief)
from Garkane Power Association by deed. Garkane Power Association retained
approximately 20 acres (See Exhibit "H" attached to Defendants Initial Brief),
(Garkane property is identified as K-19-9 ANNEX on said exhibit). The
Mackelprang (Appellant) property is identified as lot "32" on said exhibit.
In 1996 Alvey filed a complaint against Mackelprang claiming a prescriptive
easement over the Mackelprang property (lot "32") for ingress to and egress from
the Alvey property (K-19-9 ANNEX). From 1987 when Alvey purchased his
property to the present time, the Alvey property (K-19-9 ANNEX) does not abut

the Mackelprang property lot "32".
In 1997, Alvey received a Quit Claim deed from Garkane (See Exhibit "G"
Attached to Defendants Initial Brief) which conveyed to Alvey an undivided one
half interest in that portion of Garkane property covering the entire westerly 60
foot wide portion of the 50-foot strip. This conveyance resulted in a third parcel
being created, which is 60 by 50 feet in size, which abuts the Mackelprang
property.
V. SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Plaintiff failed to perfect an appeal from the final, appealable
Summary Judgment of the trial court; therefore, this Court lacks jurisdiction to
consider the merits of Plaintiffs Cross-appeal. The Cross-appeal of Plaintiff
should be dismissed.
It is undisputed that from 1987 when Alvey purchased his property to the
present time, the Alvey property (K-19-9 ANNEX) does not abut the Mackelprang
property lot "32". (See Exhibit "F" attached to Defendants Initial Brief) In
Farnsworthv. Soter's Inc.. 24 Utah 2d 199, 468 P.2d 372, 373 (Utah 1970), the
court stated the following, 'In defining "abut" Corpus Juris Secundum in 1 C.J.S.
p. 406 relates the following: "It has been said that it conveys the idea of
bordering on, bounded by, with nothing intervening Plaintiffs have
suggested nothing to the contrary. Plaintiffs are not abutting owners since there
is a strip of land between their property and the roadway to which they claim right
of access."' [emphasis added]

Utah case law is clear that "an easement of way does not insure
to the benefit of the owner of a parcel which after the division does not abut on the
way". See Wood v. Ashbv, 122 Utah 580, 253 P.2d 351, 354 (Utah 1952).
The Judgment entered in the above-entitled matter filed on November 1,
1999, (See Exhibit "C" attached to Defendants Initial Brief) does not Find or
Decree that the prescriptive roadway easement is for the use and benefit of the
third parcel being created, (See Exhibit "H" attached to Defendants Initial Brief).
In fact Garkane which has an undivided one-half interest in this third parcel
has disclaimed any interest in the Mackelprang property. (See Exhibit "B"
attached to Defendants Initial Brief)
Since it is undisputed that the Alvey property does not abut the
Mackelprang property a prescriptive roadway easement cannot benefit the Alvey
property. Because Plaintiff failed to perfect an appeal from the trial court, the
Cross-appeal of Plaintiff should be dismissed.
VI. ARGUMENT
DID PLAINTIFF FAIL TO PERFECT AN APPEAL FROM THE FINAL,
APPEALABLE JUDGMENT OF THE TRIAL COURT; AND THEREFORE,
DOES THIS COURT LACK JURISDICTION TO CONSIDER THE MERITS OF
PLAINTIFFS CROSS-APPEAL? SHOULD THE CROSS-APPEAL OF
PLAINTIFF BE DISMISSED?
This court lacks jurisdiction over the Plaintiffs Cross-Appeal because the
Plaintiff has not filed a notice of appeal with the trial court within 30 days from
the final, appealable Judgment of the trial court; and therefore, this Court lacks
jurisdiction to consider the merits of Plaintiffs Cross-appeal.

Appeals permitted, as a matter of right must be filed not more than 30
days after the entry of final judgment or order. Utah R. App. P. 4(a).
If an appeal is not timely filed, this court lacks jurisdiction to hear the
appeal. See State v. Montova. 825 P.2d 676, 678 (Utah Ct. App. 1991); see
also Prowswood, Inc. v. Mountain Fuel Supply Co., 676 P.2d 952, 955 (Utah
1984) ("It is axiomatic in this jurisdiction that failure to timely perfect an appeal
is a jurisdictional failure requiring dismissal of the appeal.").
The Plaintiffs' cross-appeal, was not timely as it was not filed in
compliance with both subsections (a) and (b) of Rule 4 of the Utah Rules of
Appellate Procedure, requiring that notice of appeal be filed within thirty days
after the date of entry of the judgment or order appealed from.
On July 10, 1998, pursuant to the parties respective motion's for Partial
Summary Judgments, the Honorable K. L. Mclff, in the Sixth Judicial District
Court, granted Partial Summary Judgment in favor of the defendants, in which
the court found that the claimed 60-foot deeded roadway easement on the
westerly 60 feet of defendants' residential property was a legal nullity, this
judgment which is now final, was filed December 23, 1998, (See Exhibit "A"
attached) and has not been appealed by any of the parties.
On November 10, 2000, when Plaintiff filed there Notice of Cross-Appeal
they appealed only "the Judgment entered on November 1, 1999, and the Order
Denying New Trial entered October 2, 2000." (See Exhibit "B" attached).
In Plaintiffs "DOCKETING STATEMENT" filed with the Court the only

issues presented on cross-appeal are: "The issues presented by the crossappeal are whether the 60 foot easement was valid, and whether is was
transferable to the Plaintiff." (See Exhibit "C" attached, page 2, paragraph 5.)
The trial court ruled on the pre-trial issues of the 60-foot easement on July
10, 1998, in the judgment filed December 23, 1998. (See Exhibit "A" attached).
In Plaintiffs' Initial Brief filed with the Court on March 26, 2001, on page 3
the second paragraph under "STATEMENT OF THE CASE" the Plaintiff states:
"The trial court ruled, via pre-trial partial summary judgment, that the reservation
of the 60-foot easement by Plaintiff's predecessor did not create a valid
easement, and that the transfer of the 60-foot easement to Plaintiff was therefore
ineffectual."
It is undisputed that neither of the parties to this action has appealed the
summary judgment filed on December 23, 1998, which are the issues, which
Plaintiff now wants the court to review.
Since it is undisputed that Plaintiffs' failed to file their notice of appeal
within 30 days after the date of entry of the judgment, this court may not
entertain their appeal. Plaintiffs' notice of appeal was not filed within thirty days,
as required by rule 4(a) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. Failure to file
a timely notice of appeal deprives this court of jurisdiction over the appeal. See
Armstrong Rubber Co. v. Bastian. 657 P.2d 1346, 1348 (Utah 1983); Bowen v.
Riverton City. 656 P.2d 434, 436 (Utah 1982).
Paragraph (e) of the same rule 4 nevertheless provides that the trial court,

upon a showing of excusable neglect or good cause, may extend the time for
filing a notice of appeal upon motion filed not later than 30 days after the
expiration of the time prescribed by paragraph (a) of this r u l e . . . . No extension
shall exceed 30 days past the prescribed time or 10 days from the date of
entry of the order granting the motion, whichever occurs later.
Utah R. App. P. 4(e) (emphasis added).
Because Plaintiff has never filed a notice of appeal, for the Summery
Judgment filed December 23, 1998, which addresses the issues, which Plaintiffs
seek the Court to review, concerning the 60-foot roadway easement, this court
should dismiss the Plaintiffs Cross-appeal for lack of jurisdiction.

DID THE DISTRICT COURT ERR IN CONCLUDING THAT PLAINTIFFS ARE
ENTITLED TO A PRESCRIPTIVE EASEMENT BENEFITING A PARCEL OF
LAND, WHICH DOES NOT ABUT THE ROADWAY TO WHICH THEY CLAIM
RIGHT OF ACCESS, BY PRESCRIPTIVE EASEMENT?
A. When Garkane deeds to Alvey a 50 by 60-foot strip of land which abuts
the claimed prescriptive easement as an undivided one-half interest with
Garkane, this does not change the fact that Alveys' property does not abut
Mackelprangs' lot "32".
Plaintiffs' claim, in their Reply Brief that they do not need to abut the
Mackelprang property to claim a prescriptive easement. Plaintiffs' cite no Utah
case law in support of their position. Utah case law is clear in Wood v. Ashby,
122 Utah 580, 253 P.2d 351, 354 (Utah 1952), in which the court stated that an
easement of way does not inure to the benefit of the owner of a parcel
which, after the division, does not abut on the way.' [emphasis added]

Affirming a decision for a servient owner, restraining the defendants from
claiming any general and unrestricted right of way and allowing the defendants
a right of way for road purposes across the land in controversy only at a point
where a gate existed in a fence along a specific portion of the land, the court in
Wood, although recognizing that a right of way appurtenant to an estate is
appurtenant to every part of it and inures to the benefit of the owners of every
part, stated that nevertheless, the partition of the dominant tenement cannot
create a further or additional easement across a servient tenement and an
easement of way does not inure to the benefit of the owner of a parcel which,
after the division, does not abut on the way. The court stated that where the
resulting use will increase the burden upon the servient estate, the right to the
easement will be extinguished. Concerning the defendants' contention that
upon the subdivision of the land they would be entitled to an unrestricted
general right of way over and across any and all portions of the dominant
tenement, the court stated that it was clear that if the owners of the subdivided
portions were given such a right of way, it would increase the burden upon the
servient estate and such would result in a substantial increase in the use of the
servient estate other than that contemplated by the parties at the time of the
grant. The court further stated that the abnormal development of the use of the
dominant estate brought about by recent erection of defense installations in the
area could not be found to be within the contemplation of either the grantor or
the grantee in the original deed, and a division of the entire dominant estate into
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several lots, with the expectation that each portion would obtain a right of way
over the servient tenement, could not be a use contemplated by the parties at
the time of the grant and reservation.
In, Mawson v. J.G. Inv. Co.. 23 Utah 2d 437, 464 P.2d 595, 595 (Utah
1970), the Utah Supreme Court in an appeal from a judgment in an action where
the plaintiff sought removal of a fence erected by defendant on the boundary of a
parcel deeded and used as a roadway held the following:
The findings of the trial court, supported by the record, show that
plaintiff acquired three lots alongside the roadway, together with 1/5
of the latter, all of which had been deeded to plaintiffs predecessor,
then to plaintiff, the 1/5 interest "to be used as a roadway." This
roadway abutted a number of lots to the North and South, and
obviously the conveyances of fractional interests thereof to abutting
lot owners was intended to be used and was used only for ingress
and egress to such lots. They were conveyances of roadway rights,
not fee rights, sort of in the nature of dominant estates to which the
fee, including underground rights, - in minerals, for example, - was
servient. Plaintiffs right to use the roadway was for such purpose of
ingress to and egress from any property, which he owned along the
roadway. Hence his claim in this action that because he had
acquired land to the East and beyond the described roadway,
he could use such easement for ingress to and egress from
such land to which the road in no way, conveyance-wise or
otherwise, was appurtenant, must fail.' [emphasis added]
Alvey is not entitled to a prescriptive easement from lot "32" to access the
50 by 60 foot lot. The Judgment entered in the above-entitled matter filed on
November 1, 1999, (See Exhibit "C" attached to Defendants Initial Brief) does not
Find or Decree that the prescriptive roadway easement is for the use and benefit
of the third parcel being created. (See Exhibit "H" attached to Defendants Initial
Brief). See Judgment in exhibit "C" pg. 2, Findings of Fact, par. 1, which states
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the legal description of the Alvey property, pg. 14, Conclusion of Law, par. 9 and
pg. 16, Order, Judgment, and Decree, par. 1. In the above stated Judgment the
findings, conclusions and decree only find and order that the easement on lot "32"
is for the use and benefit of the Alvey property which does not abut the
Mackelprang property.
In fact Garkane which has an undivided one-half interest in this third parcel
has disclaimed any interest in the Mackelprang property. (See Exhibit "B"
attached to Defendants Initial Brief)
Since it is undisputed that the Alvey property does not abut the
Mackelprang property a prescriptive roadway easement cannot benefit the Alvey
property.
B. Plaintiffs cannot acquire a prescriptive easement when they are not
abutting landowners.
It is undisputed that from 1987 when Alvey purchased his property to
the present time, the Alvey property (K-19-9 ANNEX) does not abut the
Mackelprang property lot "32". (See Exhibit "F" attached to Defendants Initial
Brief) The Utah Supreme Court, in Farnsworth v. Soter's Inc., 24 Utah 2d 199,
468 P.2d 372, 373 (Utah 1970), stated the following:
'Defendant contends that plaintiffs have not been deprived of any property
right because they never had such a right. We must agree with this
contention as to the rights asserted by plaintiffs. Plaintiffs' property is not
contiguous at any point with the old roadway. There is a distance of 10
feet to 14 feet between plaintiffs' north property line and the south edge of
the roadway. In defining "abut" Corpus Juris Secundum in 1 C.J.S. p. 406
relates the following: "It has been said that it conveys the idea of
bordering on, bounded by, with nothing intervening. Plaintiffs have

suggested nothing to the contrary. Plaintiffs are not abutting owners since
there is a strip of land between their property and the roadway to which
they claim right of access. The old roadway was created by prescriptive
use and cannot otherwise be defined except by survey of the old oiled
surface. Such a survey has been conducted and drawn up by the Salt
Lake County Surveyor's office. A copy of the drawing has been entered
into evidence as exhibit D-9 and shows the strip of land referred to above.
The drawing and plaintiff Farnsworth's testimony reveal this strip of land
to be sufficiently wide to force the conclusion that the roadway was
entirely to the north of plaintiffs' property and that plaintiffs can in no
way claim to be abutting owners. No other conclusion is possible upon
the fact of this case. Since plaintiffs' sole theory on appeal rests on the
rights of an abutting owner, this appeal must fail.' [emphasis added]
This case is very similar to the facts in Farnsworth, were the Alvey property
(K-19-9 ANNEX) is 50 feet north of the Mackelprang property (lot "32"). The gate
were Alvey claims access to the Mackelprang Property is entirely to the south of
the Alvey property by 50 feet. The Alvey property (K-19-9 ANNEX) can in know
way claim to be abutting property owners to the Mackelprang lot "32".
C. A prescriptive easement could not be created providing access to
plaintiffs' property, when after the division of the dominant tenement,
plaintiffs' property does not abut on the claimed roadway easement.
Utah case law is clear that "an easement of way does not insure
to the benefit of the owner of a parcel which after the division does not abut on the
way". The Utah Supreme Court found in, Wood v. Ashbv, 122 Utah 580, 253
P.2d 351, 354 (Utah 1952), the following:
'It is true, as stated by appellant, that a right of way appurtenant to an
estate is appurtenant to every part of it and inures to the benefit of the
owners of every part. 'Nevertheless, the partition of the dominant tenement
cannot create a further or additional easement across a servient tenement,
and an easement of way does not inure to the benefit of the owner of
a parcel which after the division does not abut on the way; and where
the resulting use will increase the burden upon the servient estate, the right

to the easement will be extinguished.' 28 C.J.S., Easements, § 65(b), p.
732.' [emphasis added]
The facts of this case are similar to Wood, when Alvey purchased his
property in 1987 and Garkane partitioned the dominant tenement, Alveys' parcel
did not abut Mackelprangs' lot "32" after the division and therefore Alvey is not
entitled to an easement from lot "32".
CONCLUSION
Because Plaintiff has failed to appeal the Summery Judgment filed
December 23, 1998, which addresses the issues, which Plaintiffs seek the Court
to review, concerning the 60-foot roadway easement, this court should dismiss
the Plaintiffs Cross-appeal for lack of jurisdiction.
Alvey is not entitled to a prescriptive easement from lot "32" to access the
50 by 60 foot lot. The Judgment entered in the above-entitled matter filed on
November 1, 1999 does not Find or Decree that the prescriptive roadway
easement is for the use and benefit of the third parcel being created. In fact
Garkane, which has an undivided one-half interest in this third parcel, has
disclaimed any interest in the Mackelprang property.
It is undisputed that from 1987 when Alvey purchased his property to
the present time, the Alvey property does not abut the Mackelprang property.
Utah case law is clear that an easement of way does not benefit the owner of a
parcel which after the division does not abut on the way. Since it is undisputed
that the Alvey property does not abut the Mackelprang property a prescriptive

roadway easement cannot benefit the Alvey property.
Therefore, the defendant respectfully requests this Court to reverse the
district court's judgment quieting title to a prescriptive easement on the
Mackelprang property for the benefit of the Alvey property and that this Court
dismisses Plaintiffs Cross-appeal for lack of jurisdiction.
.Dated this 30th day of April, 2001
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ADDENDUM

EXHIBIT "A"

VAN MACKELPRANG (5996)
MICHAEL W.PARK (2516)
THE PARK FIRM, P.C.
376 E. Sunland Dr., #1
P.O. Box 2438
St. George, UT 84771
Telephone: (435) 673-8689

FILED
KAME COHMTv

FILED
KAMP COHMTV

DEC 2 G 1998
Clerk
ClerK
SIXTH DISTRICT C C T j r j T ^ T ^ R i C T COURT

DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
KANE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
ALVEY DEVELOPMENT CORP.,
Plaintiff,
vs.
ORDER, FINDINGS OF FACT
AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

VAN AND JAMIE RAE MACKELPRANG,
KANAB CREEK RANCHOS, INC.,
And JOHN DOES 1-10,
Defendant(s).
VAN AND JAMIE RAE MACKELPRANG,

Judge K.L. Mclff

Counter-Claimant(s),
vs.
ALVEY DEVELOPMENT CORP.,

Case No. 960600070
Counter-Claim Defendant(s).

THIS MATTER having come before the Court on July 10, 1998, pursuant to the
parties respective Motion's for Partial Summary Judgements, the Honorable K.L. Mclff,
District Court Judge, presiding. The Cross-Claimant Jamie Mackelprang was not present
l

but was represented personally by attorney Van Mackelprang and Plaintiff LaDell Alvey
was present personally and was represented by attorney Todd Macfarlane. The court,
heard statements, and argument(s) from counsel. The Court, being fully advised in the
premises, having considered pending motions, statements and arguments of counsel, and
for good cause shown, hereby finds that the following are undisputed facts:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1. The Court Finds that the undisputed evidence is that the attempted
reservation of the of the sixty (60) foot easement arose from the conveyance of lot 32,
subsequent to the plating and subdivision effort. That at the time of the attempted
reservation the grantors who attempted to reserve the sixty (60) foot easement did not
have an ownership interest in the land to the North or the property referred to as the
"Jameson " property. The Court finds that the attempted reservation of said easement
was not for the benefit of the land North or the subdivision and that in either event it
could have been shown on the plat map. The Court finds that it was created solely for
the benefit of creating a situation which would give Clarkson and Snelgrove a position
of leverage in the property to the North and which could not be utilized by anyone but
said defendants and the legal effect of the attempted reservation is null and void. It did
not create an appurtenant easement, nor did it create an easement in gross, because it
had nothing to attach and could not be utilized in any meaningful way. The only
meaningful way it could be utilized was by acquiring the property northward, which said
defendants did not own and still do not own.
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ORDER AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. From the foregoing Findings of Fact the Court concludes that said reservation
did not create an easement or right and that the Quit-claim deed to Alvey in 1996,
passed no right. The Court Concludes that it was not possible for defendants to elevate
the easement to a higher level than when they attempted to created it.
Due to the fact that the Court has concluded that the attempted reserved
easement is a legal nullity, the Court does not need reach a legal conclusion in
response to the protective covenants. The Court will not resolve all the issues
concerning the restrictive covenants and considers those issues still open and does not
need to resolve them, because of the way the court has ruled on the sixty (60) foot
claim of reservation.
DATED this < £ S day of December, 1998.
BY THE COURT:

K.L.
District Court Judge

APPROVED AS TO FORM & CONTENT:

ll^MtA^M^
COLIN R. WINCHESTER
Attorney for Alvey Development Corp.

-7/A? / K ^ < ~ ^
VAN MACKELPRANG
Attorney for Litigants Mackelprang

EXHIBIT "B"
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COLIN R. WINCHESTER [4696]
ATTORNEY FOR PLAINTIFF
34 North Main Street
Kanab, Utah 84741
Telephone: (801) 644-5278
Facsimile: (801) 644-8156
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IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR KANE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

ALVEY DEVELOPMENT CORP*. ,
NOTICE OF CROSS-APPEAL
Plaintiff,
v.
Case No. 960600070
VAN MACKELPRANG, et. al.,
ASSIGNED JUDGE: K. L. McIFF
Defendants.

NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that the Plaintiff cross-appeals from
both the Judgment entered on November 1, 1999, and the Order
Denying New Trial entered October 2, 2000.

DATED this 7th day of November, 2000.

&

COLIN R. WINCHESTER
Attorney for Plaintiff
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VAN MACKELPRANG Pro se
328 W. Kanab Creek Dr.
Kanab, UT 84741
Telephone: (435) 644-8816
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IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR

' ' -c no. ^ S

'Fir"'"

KANE COUNTY. STATE OF UTAH
ALVEY DEVELOPMENT CORP ,
Plaintiff,
vs.

NOTICE Or APPEAL

VAN MACKELPRANG, et. a l ,

Case No 960600070
Judge K L Mclff

Defendanl(s).

NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that the Defendant(s), appeals to the Utah Court of
Appeals the Judgment entered in the above-entitled matte/ on November 1, 1999 and
the Order Denying New Trial entered in the above-entitled matter on October 2, 2000
DATED this 3-fr day of October, 2000
Vaan Mackelprang
Defendant
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true, full and correct copy of the foregoing document
was mailed, by first class mail, postage fully prepaid on the M& day of October, 2000,
to- Colin R. Winchester Esq , 34 North Main St, Kanab, Ul 84741
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Van Mackelprang

EXHIBIT "C"

COLIN R WINCHESTER [4696]
ATTORNEY FOR PLAINTIFF
34 North Main Street
Kanab, Utah 84741
Telephone: (801) 644-5278
Facsimile. (801) 644-8156

IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT

ALVEY DEVELOPMENT CORP ,

) DOCKETING STATEMENT

Plaintiff and Appellee,
v.

) Subject to Assignment to
) the Utah Court of Appeals
)

VAN MACKELPRANG, et. al.,

) Case No

Defendants and Appellants

1.

PERTINENT DATES

20000946-SC

)

On December 23, 1998, the trial court

entered an "Order, Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law"
declaring that Plaintiff's claimed 60 foot easement was invalid.
On December 31, 1998, Plaintiff filed a motion for a new trial.
On November 1, 1999, the trial court entered "Findings of Fact,
Conclusions of Law, and Judgment Quieting Title" granting
Plaintiff a prescriptive easement across Defendant's property
Defendant filed a motion for new trial on November 10, 1999

On

October 2, 2000, the trial court entered its "Order Denying
[both] Motions for New Trial.

Defendant appealed on October 26,

2000, and Plaintiff filed its cross-appeal on November 7, 2000.
2.

JURISDICTIONAL AUTHORITY.

The Utah Supreme Court has

jurisdiction as provided by Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3) (j)

1

3.

NATURE OF THE PROCEEDING.

This is a cross-appeal taken

from an Order Denying Motions for New Trial entered by the Sixth
Judicial District Court.
4.

STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS.

Plaintiff sought to

enforce a recorded 60 foot easement across property owned by
Defendant.

Prior to trial, the trial court ruled that the

easement was invalid.

At trial, the trial court granted

Plaintiff an easement by prescription (10 foot in width, or 16.5
foot in width if fenced) over Defendant's property.
filed motions for new trial, which were denied.

Both parties

Both sides now

appeal the trial court's rulings.
5.

ISSUES PRESENTED ON CROSS-APPEAL.

The issues presented

by the cross-appeal are whether the 60 foot easement was valid,
and whether it was transferable to the Plaintiff.
6.

SUBJECT TO ASSIGMENT TO UTAH COURT OF APPEALS.

This

appeal is subject to assignment to the Utah Court of Appeals.
7.

DETERMINATIVE CASE CITATIONS.

Johnson v. Higley, 989

P.2d 61 (Utah Ct. App. 1999); Crane v. Crane, 683 P.2d 1062 (Utah
1984) .
8.

PRIOR APPEALS.

This is a cross-appeal to the appeal

filed by the Defendants.

DATED this 30th day of December, 2000.

COLIN R. WINCHESTER
Attorney for Plaintiff
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